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MENTAL CRUELTY AS GROUNDS
FOR DIVORCE
MEYER H. WEINSTEIN*
N AN age which evidences a crying need for uniformity in our state
laws, it is not surprising that we observe a desire on the part of
both laymen and lawyers to effect a common understanding of one of
the most fundamental problems in present day society, namely, divorce.
Within the last decade we have witnessed to our shame, the trooping of
thousands of individuals to certain states, in which states the statutes
on divorce have been so purposely liberalized so as to render it possible
for either party of the marriage to obtain a dissolution of the marriage
bond for almost any reason which the complaining party may wish to
give. Of such states and their divorce laws, there need not be any dis-
cussion as to the legal or sociological reasoning for this so-called lib-
eralism. Suffice it to observe that the most important requirement for
such divorces, is the establishment of residence by the complaining
party in that state for such time as is provided for by statute. Perhaps
it were better that such states classify such divorce statutes under more
appropriate titles; as for instance, "A Bill for the Benefit of Hotels *and
Inns."
However, we cannot fail to observe that such havens of redress or
relief, whether real or fancied, have had serious repercussions upon
the trend of judicial policy, statutory enactment and public opinion in
other states.
To point out and analyze the many different divorce statutes con-
tained in the law books of the various states, would be quite impossible
in any one article. However, there is one ground for divorce which is
common to most jurisdictions and which represents a most surprising
phenomenon. This is a question as to whether or not mental anguish
or mental cruelty may or may not constitute a legal ground for divorce.
Cruelty is a common statutory ground for divorce, either a mensa or
a vincula.' The statutes differ in language. In many, the offense is
described as "extremely cruelty, ' 2 or as, "cruel and inhuman treat-
ment"3 or language having a similar import; and in others, the conduct
constituting the offense is described in more or less detail.4
* Member of Illinois Bar.
I See statutes of the different states.
2 fMikkelsen v. Same, 239 Ill. App. 366.
3 Rebstock v. Rebstock, 144 N. Y. 289.
4 Statutes of Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In view of the great diversity in the language of the several statutes,
it is impossible to frame a definition of cruelty, which will be of uni-
versal application. It has been frequently defined as actual, personal
violence, or conduct causing a reasonable apprehension of it, or such
a course of treatment as endangers life, limb, or health, and renders
cohabitation unsafe.5 It is established in most jurisdictions, however,
that mere want of congenialty, or incompatability of temperament and
the consequent warring of the parties will not justify a charge of
cruelty on the part of either; nor is jealousy or overbearing conduct on
the part of the husband or wife a ground for divorce.' Laws were
primarily enacted for the protection of humanity; and the individual
therefore looks to the law for aid in eliminating or for protection in
prohibiting certain conditions as may eventually terminate in physical
or mental discomfort, or even death.
It has been well established without exception in all states, that
where a neighbor becomes noisy or riotous, he is considered a nuisance
by the adjoining neighbors, and the law gives such offended neighbors
a remedy,-namely, an injunction to abate such a nuisance. Certainly
in such cases, it is quite apparent that the law affords the offended
mental relief. Thus, we observe that in cases where the individual
suffers even minor infractions, he is given the necessary and adequate
relief.
Divorce, being a remedy enacted solely for the purpose of affording
relief to two contracting parties, whose marital life have become un-
bearable to either or both and inasmuch as cruelty is one of the
grounds for divorce in most jurisdictions, the following questions are
presented for weighty consideration:
1. What is the degree necessary to sustain an action of divorce?
2. Should physical violence be a necessary element to sustain such
an action?
3. Should mere want of congenialty, incompatibility of tempera-
ment, or continued wranglings of the parties justify a charge of
cruelty ?
4. Should the courts be granted unlimited powers of discretion in
determining the probability of cause, or should they be guided entirely
by statutes?
The most important question is whether, where physical violence
is entirely lacking, there may be cruelty arising merely from mental
unkindness, where its effects be deemed sufficiently serious? This is the
problem of mental cruelty or mental anguish. Although some of the
5 Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254, 6 N.W. 807.
6 Maddox v. Maddox, 189 II. 152, 59 N.E. 599, 82 A. 2\1. St. Rep. 431, 52 L.R.A.
628; Ward v. Ward, 103 I11. 477.
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courts did not absolutely exclude mental cruelty as a grounds for
divorce, it was, until recently, seldom found to be sufficient without
physical violence. Even in recent decisions, the courts, although in-
clined toward the view that nothing but misery is to be attained by
compelling the parties to live together where there is mental distress
to -one or both, are nevertheless confined to their statutes, which spe-
cifically designate when and how the divorce should be granted, regard-
less to the mental feelings of the parties.
SINGLE ACTS OF CRUELTY
In most jurisdictions a single act of cruelty does not ordinarily
constitute a ground for divorce, unless it is such as to endanger life.7
But, some of the courts hold that a single act of aggravated cruelty
may warrant a divorce if accompanied with brutal neglect and aban-
donment or with such precedent or attendant circumstances as to
satisfy the court that such acts are likely to be repeated:s In some
states, if it is of such character as to render intolerable the subsequent
living together of the parties as husband and wife, such a condition
justifies the granting of a divorce.9 Other courts, however, have held
that a fixed or consistent habit of cruelty need not appear.' 0 And even
in those jurisdictions, where the statutes require that there shall be
"extreme or repeated" cruelty, two distinct acts of violence are held
sufficient, provided there is not too great lapse of time between the
distinct acts."
The opinion as recited in the Wisconsin courts on this point is
quoted as follows, "If the conduct of the guilty party is such
as to naturally cause great mental suffering to the other and
render impairment of health probable, so that further efforts to
perform the duties of the marriage state would be dangerous, that
is sufficient.' 1 2 While actual bodily harm or apprehension thereof
need not be shown to justify granting a divorce on the ground of
cruelty, yet there must have been such treatment as to destroy the
peace of mind and happiness of the injured party, and to endanger
the health or utterly defeat the legitimate objects of the marriage.
This opinion should be compared with the opinion submitted by a New
7 Reinhard v. Reinhard, 96 Wis. 555, 71 N.W. H. 0. 3; Freeman v. Freemian, 31
Wis. 235.
s Mahone v. Mahone, 19 Cal. 626, 81 A. M. Dec. 91; Day v. Day, 56 N.H. 316.
9 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 36 Reg. 92.
'OMenzer v. Menzer, 83 Mich. 319 47 N.W. 219.
"3 Eberton v. Eberton, 50 N.C. 202.
I2Hiecke v. Hiecke, 163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747; See also Johnson v. Johnson,
107 Wis. 186, 83 N.W. 291; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235;Crichlon v.
Crichlon, 73 Wis. 59, 40 N.W. 638.
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Jersey court in which it is held "that proof of three or four separate
acts of violence occuring at different times during a period of twefity
months, each occasion by a mere incident, unaccompanied by any evi-
dence of malice, and which did not cause a condition of terror or
apprehension for the future, and did not prevent the continuation of
the conubial relation, will not sustain a decree of divorce from bed and
board on a ground of extreme cruelty."' 3
On the other hand there is a Missouri case which holds" that courts
interfere on the ground of cruelty to prevent future harm, rather than
to punish the defendant for what has been already done.' 4 In com-
paring the differences of opinion between the New Jersey and the
Missouri case, one is faced with the question as to whether or not the
abused party must wait until he or she is bruised or actually disabled
before relief can be granted him or her? Does it not seem apparent in
the New Jersey case that after three or four acts of violence, no matter
how slight, the abused is endangered, and that such a marriage cannot
harmoniously continue?
In Illinois, as required by statute, two distinct acts of violence must
be proved to sustain an actual divorce charging cruelty. The injustice
of such a strict requirement may be indicated by the following illus-
tration that occurred in a Chicago Court room. A husband and wife
had agreed, that for various reasons, the marital relation could not be
continued. It was agreed that the wife was to obtain the divorce, with-
out the husband contesting it. In proving her case, the wife testified in
an action charging cruelty, stating that her husband ha dstruck her on
one specific instance. This was considered insufficient by the court, and
the case was continued until the following day for further proof. The
next day when the wife again took the witness stand the court noticed
a bruised eye and lip and asked her what had happened during the few
hours that had elapsed since her last appearance in court. She very
innocently informed him that her husband had struck her, in order
that she might have one other act of violence and thus procure her
divorce. 15
This illustration may perhaps seem grossly exaggerated and per-
haps ludicrous, but, it occurred primarily because of the strictness of
the law governing such a situation, which the judge could not remedy
by using his own discretion, for had he done so, it would have been
an abuse of discretion and a violation of the law.
13Hewitt v. Hewitt, 37 N.J. 101.
1' Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo., 545, 547.
5 Writer was present when this case was heard; no record of case.
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INTENTION, WILFULNESS AND MALICE
Ordinarily, intention, wilfulness or malice are necessary elements in
that cruel treatment which the law recognizes as a ground for divorce,
and according to some authorities this is true, notwithstanding that the
act complained of has a harmful effect upon the health of the other
spouse. This occurred in a Massachusetts court, where in denying a
husband a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment where the proof
showed that the health of the husband had been injuriously affected by
the acts of his wife, the court said, "It would seem that the libelee
intended to sting the libellant's feelings, and her treatment may well
have justified him in living apart from her. But there may be miscon-
duct justifying separation for a while which will not require the court
to grant a divorce, though the libellant was affected injuriously in his
health to some extent by her acts and words, she had no purpose to
harm him in this manner, but in part was moved by what seemed to
her good motives, and by a desire for his success in life, and in part
by her own nervous condition, she being in reality strongly attached
to him, and her feelings being affectionate."16
Directly contrary to the above decision it has been held that where
the health of the other spouse is seriously injured thereby, a divorce
should be granted, though the offending spouse acted without any
malevolent motives. Thus, in a New Hampshire court, where in grant-
ing a divorce to a husband whose health had become seriously injured
because his wife became a healer in a Christian Science church, and
persisted therein against his remonstrances, the court said, "a malevo-
lent motive in the party complained of need not be shown. Divorce is
not punishment of the offender but relief to the sufferer. Whether
the behavior proved is sufficient ground for divorce depends on the
question whether it has seriously injured health or endangered reason.
This is the sole test. The question is, not whether the treatment rea-
sonably ought, or could reasonably be expected, seriously to injure the
health or endanger the reason of a person of ordinary intelligence and
mental strength, but whether it has in fact had that effect upon the
health or reason of the person complaining." 17 Intention cannot always
be explained, nor are excuses always acceptable from the accused, and
so a husband who is habitually harsh toward his wife, cannot explain
away bodily injuries inflicted upon her by saying that they were
unintentionally caused in playfulness.1 8
16 Freeborn v. Freeborn, 168 Mass. 50, 52.
17 Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H., 600, 610. 23 AtI. 362.
is Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670.
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PERMITTING CRUELTY BY THIRD PERSONS
In illustrating cruelty by third persons, let us take the case of a
wife, who in the presence of a husband, is assaulted by a third party.
The husband makes no move to prevent the assault but looks calmly on.
Let us presume that this has occurred on three other occasions, which
acts have provoked numerous quarrels. Does this constitute such an act
on the part of the husband as to enable the wife to procure a divorce
charging cruelty? Certainly it cannot be denied that the wife undergoes
some mental reaction. She believes that the husband does not love her;
that the husband delights in seeing her abused and in seeing her suffer.
Her beliefs may be unwarranted or perhaps unjust, for the husband
may not be able to cope physically in defending his wife from such
third person, but to the wife, as would undoubtedly be the feeling of
the average person, there is no excuse for the husband's failure to
adopt some form of action to prevent this continued abuse. It is inter-
esting to note the opinion of a Massachusetts court in passing judgment
in a divorce action on a case of this kind. The Massachusetts ,court
states that, "undoubtedly, if the assault were in any degree participated
in or encouraged or even afterwards approved by the husband, it
would have been material evidence of cruelty on his part; in view of
the duty of protection owed to a wife by her husband, it would per-
haps have been as strong evidence against him as if he had himself
committed the assault. But he cannot be answerable for the act of a
third person, even of one with whom his relations were as close and
intimate as was alleged to be the case here, unless he is shown to have
made the act his own, either by procurement or previous assent or by
acquiescence or subsequent approval and adoption." 19 Were one to
follow the inlogical sequence of the reasoning of the Massachusetts
court, it would follow that the court, before granting a divorce to the
wife, would ask that it be shown that the husband held the wife firmly
while the third party committed the assault, or have it shown that the
husband applauded the acts of the third party during the commission
of the act.
The majority of the states however, contrary to the minority ruling,
as expressed by the Massachusetts court, hold that where the husband
permits third parties to so conduct themselves toward his wife as to
seriously impair her health, it will entitle the wife to a divorce on
ground of cruelty.2 0 It has also been held that if a wife actively aids
her children in being cruel toward her husband, she is answerable for
such conduct on the part of the children, and the husband may be
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of cruelty. The reasoning and logic
19 Hold v. Hold, 204 Mass., 25, 90 N.E. 392.
20 Day v. Day, 84 Ia., 221, 50 N.W. 979; Dakin v. Dakin, 1. Neb. 457.
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of this rule is based solely upon the mental anguish which the husband
sustains as a result of his wife's actions.
CONDUCT CAUSING MENTAL SUFFERING
In repetition of previous statements made in this article it may be
restated that actual bodily harm or apprehension thereof, must be
shown to authorize granting a divorce on the ground of cruelty, and
although this doctrine still prevails in a number of jurisdictions, the
courts have lately tried to envoke a more modern and perhaps more
sensible rule. This rnew view is that any unwarranted conduct by either
spouse which causes mental suffering, is deemed sufficient to constitute
cruetly and will permit the granting of a divorce.21
The preferred rule is quoted as follows: "The modern and better
considered cases have repudiated the doctrine requiring actual bodily
harm as a ground of divorce charging cruelty, claiming this doctrine
as taking too low and sensual view of the marriage relation, and it is
now very generally held that any unjustified conduct on the part of
either the husband or the wife, which so grievously wounds the mental
feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the
other as to seriously impair the bodily health or endanger the life of
the other, or such as in any other manner endangers the life of the
other, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of
matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty under the statutes, although no
physical or personal violence may be inflicted or even threatened.1 22
The following examples have been held to constitute cruelty:
1. The suffering caused to a husband because of the refusal of
the wife to attend to her household duties. 23
2. The wanton attack by the wife on the character of her husband
and her demands that he be expelled from the membership of a fra-
ternal organization of which he is a member.2 4
3. The unhappiness caused to the wife by reason of her husband's
insistence that she submit to abortions, thereby destroying her peace
of mind and happiness by defeating the object of the marriage rela-
tion.2
5
21Menzer v. Menzer, 83 Mich. 319, 47 N.W. 219.
22Cevene v. Cevene, 143 Wis. 393, 129 N.W. 942; Beebe v. Beebe, 174 N. Y. App.
Div. 408, 127 N.W. 942.
23 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kans. 712, 2 Pac. 122.
24 McGee v. McGee, 72 Ark. 355, 80 S.W. 579.
25 Daw'son v. Ddwson, 63 Tex. Civ. A. 168, 132 S.W. 379.
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4. The demands of a husband that his wife return to her parents
because of the wife's illness having caused an accumulation of doctor
bills which the husband no longer cares to contend with.26
We have three courts, who in rendering decisions in accordance
with the above stated rule, give the following reasons for their hold-
ings.' One holds that, "Mental anguish, wounded feelings, constantly
aggravated by repeated insults and neglect are as bad as actual bruises
of the person; and that which produces the one, is not more cruel than
that which causes the other."2 Another holds in the following manner,
"We find little patience with the insistence of the once semi-barbaric
rule that afforded an avenue of escape to the injured wife only where
physical violence was inflicted upon her."'28 A third court has held
that, "the conduct of the husband may produce such mental agony as
to be even more cruel and inhuman than if mere physical pain had been
inflicted.
29
There are numerous distinct acts of conduct that may cause mental
suffering, and they may be listed as follows:
(a) False charges of adultery, antenuptial unchastity, other
crimes, insanity, physical incapacity.
(b) Abuse of children.
(c) Adultery and lewd association.
(d) Attempts to entrap.
(e) Offensive language.
(a) Ordinarily, false charges of any of the above enumerated by
either the husband or the wife maliciously and without probable cause
has been held to constitute legal cruelty, although it has been held that
where the false charge is made by the wife, the husband is not entitled
to a divorce for cruelty, unless he shows that from his temperament or
calling, the charges produced or were likely to produce mental suffering
beyond the ordinary effect which such charge would naturally have
made upon a man. There are some cases, however, in which it has been
held that false charges of adultery, whether made by the husband or
the wife are not of themselves ground for divorce. Some cases hold
that such charges are not grounds for divorce if made while the parties
are living apart, but others hold that the mere fact that the husband
and wife were living separate does not necessarily prevent false or
malicious charges from constituting extreme cruelty. 30
28 Plainer v. Platner, Iowa, 162 N.W. 613; Dun v. Dun, 150 Mich. 476, 114 N.W.
385.
2 7Broyas v. Broyas, 106 S.W. 212.
28 Glass v. Wynn, 76 Ga. 319, 322.
29Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 41 Okla. 306, 312, 137 Pac. 711.
30 Kissam v. Kissait, 47 N.Y. S. 270.
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The prevailing rule is that the charge must be unfounded or
malicious in order to sustain the action of cruelty. It will again be
noticed that New Hampshire disagrees with this rule. The court there
says; "It is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a petition
for a divorce nothwithstanding proof of extreme cruelty in repeated
false accusations of infidelity and unchastity, where evidence tends to
show that the falsely accused spouse is not without blame for the
original excitation or subsequent perpetuation or increase of the sus-
picions of the accusing spouse, which culminates in- such accusation.''
(b) While the husband may use force in protecting himself from
unreasonable interference by the wife and the proper chastisement of
their child, yet if he maltreats the child solely to give the mother pain,
and if as a result her health is impaired, it is legal cruelty.32 It seems
that this rule, under this state of facts, should have omitted the words,
"as-a result her health is impaired." Certainly if he maltreats the child
solely to give the mother pain, the father would not appear to be a
proper person to exercise control over the child and for that reason
alone, a divorce might be granted to the wife. In an early Oregon case
it was held that lewd and indecent conduct toward a step-daughter
was not such cruel and inhuman treatment or personal indignity as
entitled the wife to a divorce.33 However, this rather inconsistent rule
has since been supplemented by a holding that such an action on the
part of the husband does entitle the wife to a divorce.
(c) In comparing the various interpretations which the many
states have given this subject which we have titled: "Adultery in Lewd
Association," we come face to face with a maze of contradicting opin-
ions which illustrates in the best possible manner the great need for a
unification of the several state statutes into a code of divorce law which
might have a nationwide application. For example, New York holds
that adultery does not constitutecruelty as grounds for divorce while
other jurisdictions state that it is cruelty toward a wife for a husband
to express his preference for, or openly consort with, lewd women, or
with the wife of another man.3 4 It is quite apparent that these" courts
differ widely in their views as to what may constitute cruelty. One
court contends that it is not cruel if one spouse engages in adulterous
relations, while another court feels that a mere expression of a prefer-
ence for other women will be considered cruelty. It has also been held
cruelty toward a wife for a husband to threaten or attempt to commit
adultery or to introduce into the bedroom of an invalid wife a loose
31 McDonald v. McDonald, 155 C.A.L. 665.
32 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La., Ann. 1696, 22 So. 929.
33 Gordon v. Gordon, 77 N.H., 597, 92 AtI. 546.
34 Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474.
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woman in an almost nude condition, accompanied by lewd behavior. A
modern view has also held that it is cruelty toward a husband for his
wife to repeatedly leave his home and their young children for several
days without excuse, and consort with other men.35
(d) Where the husband or the wife maliciously concoct schemes
to entrap one or the other into the appearance of having committed
adultery for the purpose of securing evidence to be used in a suit for
divorce, such behavior constitutes cruelty which entitles the injured
party to a divorce. However, some courts have held that the effect of
such conduct must have been to endanger the life of a party sought to
be entrapped, in order that it constitutes cruelty. This was so held in an
Iowa case in which the court stated, "that although such conduct was
most dastardly, cruel and unreasonable, it is not a ground for divorce
in the absence of showing that the wife's life was endangered
thereby." 36 In considering entrapment as an action of cruelty, the ques-
tion has often arisen as to whether the employment of a detective to
follow the husband or wife, is such an entrapment as to constitute
cruelty. The determining factor in such a tuestion is the conduct of
either of the parties. If the husband or wife is induced to employ a
detective because of the immoral conduct of the other, then it is not
cruelty to the party who is being surveilled, but if there is no basis for
such an attitude, the courts have held that there is such a mental dis-
tress produced as to constitute cruelty.
(e) Whether the habitual use of rough language is cause for a
divorce on the ground of cruelty depends upon the character of the
parties and the degree of cultivation they exhibit. It is generally held,
however, that a systematic and continued use by the husband of vile,
profane and unkind language in the presence of and towrd the wife,
causing mental suffering and threatening permanent injury to her
health, entitles her to. a divorce.3 7 In Illinois, offensive or abusive lan-
guage, unaccompanied by some physical act, is not considered cruelty
as to entitle either of the parties a divorce . 3 It has been held that pro-
fane, obscene, and insulting language toward a wife by the husband,
may amount to extreme cruelty, but that this same language used by
the wife toward the husband is not recognized as such extreme cruelty.
Why such a differentiation is made, the courts do not say and yet
divorces have been granted to wives on this ground and refused to
husbands where the wife has been the one who has been guilty of using
35 Allen v. Allen, 110 N. Y. S. 303; Contra, Tower v. To'wer, 134 App. Div. 670,
119 N. Y. S., 506.
36 Eistedt v. Eistedt, 178 Mich. 371, 153 N.W., 676.
37 Blair v. Blair, 106 Ia. 269, 76 N.W. 700.
38 Sturgis v. Sturgis, 173 Mich. 597, 139 N.W. 866.
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profane language of a like nature. Whether the wife's feelings have
been considered more sensitive than those of the husband has not been
stated by the courts. The reason for such differentiation has not been
given.
CONCLUSION
This article is not intended to convey the impression that in all
cases of slight marital differences a divorce should be granted, for such
an attitude undoubtedly would result in untold abuses and dangers
where such liberal interpretations applied.
There is no doubt but that wounded mental feelings caused by
austerity of temper, petulence of manner, rudeness of language, or a
want of civil attention, if they do not threaten bodily harm, are never-
theless a moral offense in the marriage state. Surely these are differ-
ences which the law does not contemplate when it gave individuals the
right of the redress in dissolving the relation created by the contract
between two human beings known as matrimony. Under such mis-
conduct of either of the parties it is quite obvious that either or both
of the parties must bear in some degree the consequences of slight
inherent or acquired differences which are bound to arise in the matri-
monial state. However, where the differences become aggravated and
cruel and cannot be remedied by prudent conciliation, must they both
suffer in silence and risk the possibility of allowing this torment to
drive them into acts of violence and thereby injure the person or the
lives of one of the parties. It has frequently been complained of that
because of the inability of the courts to pass judgment on these mat-
ters without the restrictions imposed on them by statute, much injus-
tice has been suffered and much misery permitted. The complaint may
be answered by saying that the courts of justice do not pretend to
furnish cures for all the miseries of life. They redress or punish gross
violations of duties, but go no further. The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan expressed its ideas on this subject as follow: "The law does not
permit courts to sever the marriage bond and to break up households
merely because parties from unruly tempers or mutual wranglings,
live unhappily together. It requires them to submit to the ordinary
consequences of human infirmities and of unwise selections, and the
misconduct which will form a good ground for a legal separation must
be very serious, and such as amounts to extreme cruelty, entirely sub-
verting the family relations by rendering the association intolerable. ' ' 3
The Supreme Court of California stated as a test of cruelty the
following: "Although the character of the ill treatment whether it
operates directly upon the body, or primarily upon the mind alone,
39 Duberstein v. Duberstein, 171 Il1. 133, 49 N.E. 316.
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and all the attending circumstances are to be considered for the pur-
pose-,of estimating the degree of cruelty, yet the final test and the
suffring, as a cause of divorce, must be its actual or reasonably appre-
hended injurious effects upon the body or health of the complaining
party. The practical view of the law is that a degree of cruelty which
cannot be perceived to injure the body or the health of the body can
be practically endured, and must be endured if there is no other remedy
than by divorce, because no skill by which to gauge the purely mental
susceptibilities and sufferings has yet been invented or discovered,
except such as indicate the degree thereof by their perceptible effects
upon the physical organization of the body." 4' In a later case, however,
in this same state the court said, "that this quotation was too narrow
under their statute declaring extreme cruelty to be the infliction of
grievious bodily injury or grievious mental suffering. '41
It would appear that this test is somewhat narrow in determining
what constitutes cruelty. Perhaps the better test for determining men-
tal suffering is that when this condition becomes so great as to prey
upon the mind and thereby undermine the. health, even though the
suffering is caused by words and conduct, unaccompanied by any act
of physical violence, the result is bodily harm and hence such conduct
constitutes legal cruelty.
As to the effect of mental suffering upon bodily health comes to
be more fully realized and understood, there will be no question but
that the tendency of modern decisions will be toward a much greater
latitude than has been found in the earlier cases, in granting divorces
in those cases known as "mental cruelty." Even without repudiating
the doctrine that the injury must be physical the courts are beginning
to recognize legal cruelty as existing in systematic abuse, insults of
humiliating nature and annoyances resulting in mental suffering and
consequent ill health, as fully as in acts of violence.
Let us consider a case where a husband may by a studied course
of humiliating insults and annoyances practiced in various ways with
ingenious malice, eventually impair the health of his wife, even though
such conduct has not been accompanied by-any form of violence, either
actual or threatened. Would it follow, therefore, in such a case, that
the wife had no remedy under the divorce laws because of an absence
of actual or threatened violence? The answer to this question should
be considered in conjunction with the principles on which the divorce
for cruelty is predicated. Cruelty should be judged from its effects, not
solely from the means by which those effects are produced. To hold
absolutely that the avoidance by the husband of either positive or per-
40 Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251, 24 Pac. 649-858.
41 Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich. 205.
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sonal violence against the wife, makes him immune against any charge
of cruelty as defined by the divorce statutes, is to invite a system of
abuse. Thus, it is possible to assume, that because of such condition
and diverse opinions, we will witness a more unified enactment of laws
by the individual state legislatures, which will be broad enough to per-
mit the courts wider discretion in determining what is that degree of
mental anguish or mental cruelty which is a legal ground for divorce.
42Barnies v. Barnes, 95 Cal. 171, 30 Pac. 298.
